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Abstract
We investigate the direct-sum problem in the context of differentially private PAC learning: What
is the sample complexity of solving k learning tasks simultaneously under differential privacy, and how
does this cost compare to that of solving k learning tasks without privacy? In our setting, an individual
example consists of a domain element x labeled by k unknown concepts (c1, . . . , ck). The goal of a
multi-learner is to output k hypotheses (h1, . . . , hk) that generalize the input examples.
Without concern for privacy, the sample complexity needed to simultaneously learn k concepts is
essentially the same as needed for learning a single concept. Under differential privacy, the basic strategy
of learning each hypothesis independently yields sample complexity that grows polynomially with k.
For some concept classes, we give multi-learners that require fewer samples than the basic strategy.
Unfortunately, however, we also give lower bounds showing that even for very simple concept classes,
the sample cost of private multi-learning must grow polynomially in k.
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1 Introduction
The work on differential privacy [18] is aimed at providing useful analyses on privacy-sensitive data while
providing strong individual-level privacy protection. One family of such analyses that has received a lot
of attention is PAC learning [34]. These tasks abstract many of the computations performed over sensitive
information [26].
We address the direct-sum problem – what is the cost of solving multiple instances of a computational
task simultaneously as compared to solving each of them separately? – in the context of differentially
private PAC learning. In our setting, individual examples are drawn from domain X and labeled by k
unknown concepts (c1, . . . , ck) taken from a concept class C = {c : X → {0, 1}}, i.e., each example is of
the form (x, y1, . . . , yk), where x ∈ X and yi = ci(x). The goal of a multi-learner is to output k hypotheses
(h1, . . . , hk) that generalize the input examples while preserving the privacy of individuals.
The direct-sum problem has its roots in complexity theory, and is a basic problem for many algorithmic
tasks. It also has implications for the practical use of differential privacy. Consider, for instance, a hospital
that collects information about its patients and wishes to use this information for medical research. The hos-
pital records for each patient a collection of attributes such as age, sex, and the results of various diagnostic
tests (for each patient, these attributes make up a point x in some domain X) and, for each of k diseases,
whether the patient suffers from the disease (the k labels (y1, . . . , yk)). Based on this collection of data,
the hospital researchers wish to learn good predictors for the k diseases. One option for the researchers is
to perform each of the learning tasks on a fresh sample of patients, hence enlarging the number of patient
examples needed (i.e. the sample complexity) by a factor of k, which can be very costly.
Without concern for privacy, the sample complexity that is necessary and sufficient for performing the k
learning tasks is actually fully characterized by the VC dimension of the concept class C – it is independent
of the number of learning tasks k. In this work, we set out to examine if the situation is similar when the
learning is performed with differential privacy. Interestingly, we see that with differential privacy the picture
is quite different, and in particular, the required number of examples can grow polynomially in k.
Private learning. A private learner is an algorithm that is given an sample of labeled examples (x, c(x))
(each representing the information and label pertaining to an individual) and outputs a generalizing hy-
pothesis h that guarantees differential privacy with respect to its examples. The first differentially private
learning algorithms were given by Blum et al. [9] and the notion of private learning was put forward and
formally researched by Kasiviswanathan et al. [26]. Among other results, the latter work presented a generic
construction of differentially private learners with sample complexity O(log |C|).
In contrast, the sample complexity of (non-private) PAC learning is Θ(VC(C)), which can be much
lower than log |C| for specific concept classes. This gap led to a line of work examining the sample com-
plexity of private learning, which has revealed a significantly more complex picture than there is for non-
private learning. In particular, for pure differentially private learners, it is known that the sample complexity
of proper learning (where the learner returns a hypothesis h taken from C) is sometimes higher than the
sample complexity of improper learners (where h comes from an arbitrary hypothesis class H). The latter
is characterized by the representation dimension of the concept class C, which is generally higher than the
VC dimension [5, 4, 15, 6, 22]. By contrast, a sample complexity gap between proper and improper learners
does not exist for non-private learning. In the case of approximate differential privacy no such combinatorial
characterization is currently known. It is however known that the sample complexity of such learners can be
significantly lower than that of pure-differentially private learners and yet higher than the VC dimension of
C [6, 22, 13]. Furthermore, there exist (infinite) PAC-learnable concept classes for which no differentially
private learner (pure or approximate) exists.
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Private multi-learning. In this work we examine the sample complexity of private multi-learning. Our
work is motivated by the recurring research theme of the direct-sum, as well as by the need to understand
whether multi-learning remains feasible under differential privacy, as it is without privacy constraints.
At first glance, private multi-learning appears to be similar to the query release problem, the goal of
which is to approximate the average values of a large collection of predicates on a dataset. One surpris-
ing result in differential privacy is that it is possible to answer an exponential number of such queries on a
dataset [10, 30, 24]. For example, Blum, Ligett, and Roth [10] showed that given a dataset D and a concept
class C, it is possible to generate with differential privacy a dataset Dˆ such that the average value of c on D
approximates the average of c on Dˆ for every c ∈ C simultaneously. The sample complexity required, i.e.,
the size of the database D, to perform this sanitization is only logarithmic in |C|. Results of this flavor sug-
gest that we can also learn exponentially many concepts simultaneously. However, we give negative results
showing that this is not the case, and that multi-learning can have significantly higher sample complexity
than query release.
1.1 Our results
Prior work on privately learning the simple concept classes POINTX (of functions that evaluate to 1 on
exactly one point of their domain X and to 0 otherwise) and THRESHX (of functions that evaluate to 1
on a prefix of the domain X and to 0 otherwise) has demonstrated a rather complex picture, depending
on whether learners are proper or improper, and whether learning is performed with pure or approximate
differential privacy [5, 4, 6, 7, 13]. We analyze the sample complexity of multi-learning of these simple
concept classes, as well as general concept classes. We also consider the class PARd of parity functions,
but in this case we restrict our attention to uniformly selected examples. We examine both proper and
improper PAC and agnostic learning under pure and approximate differential privacy. For ease of reference,
we include tables with our results in Section 1.3, where we omit the dependency on the privacy and accuracy
parameters.
Techniques for private k-learning. Composition theorems for differential privacy show that the sample
complexity of learning k concepts simultaneously is at most a factor of k larger than the sample complexity
of learning one concept (and may be reduced to
√
k for approximate differential privacy). Unfortunately,
privately learning one concept from a concept class C can sometimes be quite costly, requiring much higher
sample complexity than VC(C) which is needed to learn non-privately. Building on techniques of Beimel,
Nissim, and Stemmer [8], we show that the multiplicative dependence on k can always be reduced to the
VC-dimension of C, at the expense of producing a one-time sanitization of the dataset.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). Let C be a concept class for which there is pure differentially private sanitizer for
C⊕ = {f ⊕ g : f, g ∈ C} with sample complexity m. Then there is an pure differentially private agnostic
k-learner for C with sample complexity O(m+ k ·VC(C)).
Similarly, if C⊕ has an approximate differentially private sanitizer with sample complexity m, then
there is an approximate differentially private agnostic k-learner for C with sample complexity O(m+
√
k ·
VC(C)).
The best known general-purpose sanitizers require sample complexity m = O(VC(C) log |X|) for pure
differential privacy [10] and m = O(log |C|√log |X|) for approximate differential privacy [24]. However,
for specific concept classes (such as POINTX and THRESHX ), the sample complexity of sanitization can be
much lower.
In the case of approximate differential privacy, the sample complexity of k-learning can be even lower
than what is achievable with our generic learner. Using stability-based arguments, we show that point func-
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tions and parities under the uniform distribution can be PAC k-learned with sample complexity O(VC(C))
– independent of the number of concepts k (see Theorems 3.13 and 3.12).
Lower bounds. In light of the above results, one might hope to be able to reduce the dependence on k
further, or to eliminate it entirely (as is possible in the case of non-private learning). We show that this is not
possible, even for the simplest of concept classes. In the case of pure differential privacy, a packing argument
[21, 25, 5] shows that any non-trivial concept class requires sample complexity Ω(k) to privately k-learn
(Theorem 5.1). For approximate differential privacy, we use fingerprinting codes [12, 14] to show that unlike
points and parities, threshold functions require sample complexity Ω˜(k1/3) to PAC learn privately (Corollary
4.6). Moreover, any non-trivial concept class requires sample complexity Ω˜(
√
k) to privately learn in the
agnostic model (Theorem 4.7). In the case of point functions, this matches the upper bound achievable by
our generic learner.
We highlight a few of the main takeaways from our results:
A complex answer to the direct sum question. Our upper bounds show that solving k learning problems
simultaneously can require substantially lower sample complexity than solving the problems individually.
On the other hand, our lower bounds show that a significant dependence on k is generally necessary.
Separation between private PAC and private agnostic learning. Non-privately, the sample complexi-
ties of PAC and agnostic learning are of the same order (differing only in the dependency in the accuracy
parameters). Beimel et al. [8] showed that this is also the case with differentially private learning (of one
concept). Our results on learning point functions show that private PAC and agnostic multi-learning can
be substantially different (even for learning up to constant error). In the case of approximate differential
privacy, O(1) sample suffice to PAC-learn multiple point functions. However, Ω˜(
√
k) samples are needed
to learn k points agnostically.
Separation between improper learning with approximate differential privacy and non-private learn-
ing. Recently, Bun et al. [13] showed that the sample complexity of learning one threshold function with
approximate differential privacy exceeds the VC dimension, but only in the case of proper learning. Thus
it remains possible that improper learning with approximate differential privacy can match the sample com-
plexity of non-private learning. While we do not address this question directly, we exhibit a separation for
multi-learning. In particular, learning k thresholds with approximate differential privacy requires Ω˜(k1/3)
samples, even improperly, while O(1) samples suffices non-privately.
1.2 Related work
Differential privacy was defined in [18] and the relaxation to approximate differential privacy is from [16].
Most related to our work is the work on private learning and its sample complexity [9, 26, 15, 19, 4, 6, 7, 22,
8, 13] and the early work on sanitization [10]. That many “natural” learning tasks can be performed privately
was shown in the early work of Blum et al. [9] and Kasiviswanathan et al. [26]. A characterization for the
sample complexity of pure-private learners was given in [6], in terms of a new combinatorial measure – the
Representation Dimension, that is, given a classC, the number of samples needed and sufficient for privately
learning C is Θ(RepDim(C)). Building on [6], Feldman and Xiao [22] showed an equivalence between
the representation dimension of a concept C and the randomized one-way communication complexity of the
evaluation problem for concepts from C. Using this equivalence they separated the sample complexity of
pure-private learners from that of non-private ones.
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The problem of learning multiple concepts simultaneously (without privacy) has been considered before.
Motivated by the problem of bridging computational learning and reasoning, Valiant [35] also observed that
(without privacy) multiple concepts can be learned from a common dataset in a data efficient manner.
1.3 Tables of results
The following tables summarize the results of this work. In the tables below C is a class of concepts (i.e.,
predicates) defined over domain X . Sample complexity upper and lower bounds is given in terms of |C|
and |X|. Note that for POINTX , THRESHX , and PARd we have |C| = Θ(|X|).
Where not explicitly noted, upper bounds hold for the setting of agnostic learning and lower bounds
are for the (potentially easier) setting of PAC learning. Similarly, where not explicitly noted, upper bounds
are for proper learning and lower bounds are for the (less restrictive) setting of improper learning. For
simplicity, these tables hide constant and logarithmic factors, as well as dependencies on the learning and
privacy parameters.
Multi-learning with pure differential privacy.
Upper bounds:
PAC learning Agnostic learning
C proper improper proper improper References
POINTX k + log |C| k k + log |C| k Thm. 3.1, Cor. 3.3
THRESHX k + log |C| Thm. 3.1
General min{k log |C|, kVC(C) + log |X|VC(C)} Thm. 3.1
PARd (uniform) k log |C| Thm. 3.1
Lower bounds:
PAC learning Agnostic learning
C proper improper proper improper References
POINTX k + log |C| k k + log |C| k Thm. 5.1, [5]
THRESHX k + log |C| Thm. 5.1, [5, 22]
PARd (uniform) k log |C| Thm. 5.4
Multi-learning with approximate differential privacy.
Upper bounds:
PAC learning Agnostic learning
C (proper and improper) (proper and improper)
POINTX 1 (Thm. 3.13)
√
k (Cor. 3.9)
THRESHX 2
log∗ |X| +
√
k (Cor. 3.10)
General C min{√k log |C|,√kVC(C) + log |X|VC(C),√kVC(C) +√log |X| log |C|} (Thm. 3.1)
PARd (uniform) log |C| (Thm. 3.12)
√
k log |C| (Thm. 3.1)
4
Lower bounds:
PAC learning Agnostic learning
C proper improper proper improper References
POINTX 1
√
k Cor. 4.10
THRESHX log
∗ |X|+ k1/3 k1/3 log∗ |X|+√k √k Cor. 4.6, Cor. 4.10, [13]
PARd (uniform) log |C|
√
k + log |C| Cor. 4.10)
2 Preliminaries
We recall and extend standard definitions from learning theory and differential privacy.
2.1 Multi-learners
In the followingX is some arbitrary domain. A concept (similarly, hypothesis) over domainX is a predicate
defined over X . A concept class (similarly, hypothesis class) is a set of concepts.
Definition 2.1 (Generalization Error). Let P ∈ ∆(X × {0, 1}) be a probability distribution over X ×
{0, 1}. The generalization error of a hypothesis h : X → {0, 1} w.r.t. P is defined as errorP(h) =
Pr(x,y)∼P [h(x) 6= y].
Let D ∈ ∆(X) be a probability distribution over X and let c : x → {0, 1} be a concept. The general-
ization error of hypothesis h : X → {0, 1} w.r.t. c andD is defined as errorD(c, h) = Prx∼D[h(x) 6= c(x)].
If errorD(c, h) ≤ α we say that h is α-good for c and D.
Definition 2.2 (Multi-labeled database). A k-labeled database over a domain X is a database S ∈ (X ×
{0, 1}k)∗. That is, S contains |S| elements from X , each concatenated with k binary labels.
Let A : (X × {0, 1}k)n → (2X)k be an algorithm that operates on a k-labeled database and returns k
hypotheses. Let C be a concept class over a domainX and letH be a hypothesis class overX . We now give
a generalization of the notion of PAC learning [34] to multi-labeled databases (the standard PAC definition
is obtained by setting k = 1):
Definition 2.3 (PAC Multi-Learner). Algorithm A is an (α, β)-PAC k-learner for concept class C using
hypothesis class H with sample complexity n if for every distribution D over X and for every fixture of
(c1, . . . , ck) from C, given a k-labeled database as an input S = ((xi, c1(xi), . . . , ck(xi)))
n
i=1 where each
xi is drawn i.i.d. from D, algorithm A outputs k hypotheses (h1, . . . , hk) from H satisfying
Pr
[
max
1≤j≤k
(errorD(cj , hj)) > α
]
≤ β.
The probability is taken over the random choice of the examples in S according to D and the coin tosses of
the learner A. If H ⊆ C then A is called a proper learner; otherwise, it is called an improper learner.
Definition 2.4 (Agnostic PAC Multi-Learner). AlgorithmA is an (α, β)-PAC agnostic k-learner forC using
hypothesis class H and sample complexity n if for every distribution P over X ×{0, 1}k, given a k-labeled
database S = ((xi, y1,i, . . . , yk,i))
n
i=1 where each k-labeled sample (xi, y1,i . . . , yk,i) is drawn i.i.d. from P ,
algorithm A outputs k hypotheses (h1, . . . , hk) from H satisfying
Pr
[
max
1≤j≤k
(
errorPj (hj)−min
c∈C
(
errorPj (c)
))
> α
]
≤ β,
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where Pj is the marginal distribution of P on the examples and the jth label. The probability is taken over
the random choice of the examples in S according to P and the coin tosses of the learner A. If H ⊆ C then
A is called a proper learner; otherwise, it is called an improper learner.
2.2 The Sample Complexity of Multi-Learning
Without privacy considerations, the sample complexities of PAC and agnostic learning are essentially char-
acterized by a combinatorial quantity called the Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension. We state these char-
acterizations in the context of multi-learning.
2.2.1 The Vapnik-Chervonenkis Dimension
Definition 2.5. Fix a concept classC over domainX . A set {x1, . . . , xd} ∈ X is shattered byC if for every
labeling b ∈ {0, 1}d, there exists c ∈ C such that b1 = c(x1), . . . , bd = c(xd). The Vapnik-Chervonenkis
(VC) dimension of C, denoted VC(C), is the size of the largest set which is shattered by C.
The Vapnik-Chervonenkis (VC) dimension is an important combinatorial measure of a concept class.
Classical results in statistical learning theory show that the generalization error of a hypothesis h and its
empirical error (observed on a large enough sample) are similar.
Definition 2.6 (Empirical Error). Let S = ((xi, yi))ni=1 ∈ (X × {0, 1})n be a labeled sample from X . The
empirical error of a hypothesis h : X → {0, 1} w.r.t. S is defined as errorS(h) = 1n |{i : h(xi) 6= yi}|.
Let D ∈ Xn be a (unlabeled) sample from X and let c : x→ {0, 1} be a concept. The empirical error
of hypothesis h : X → {0, 1} w.r.t. c and D is defined as errorD(c, h) = 1n |{i : h(xi) 6= c(xi)].
Theorem 2.7 (VC-Dimension Generalization Bound, e.g. [11]). LetD andC be, respectively, a distribution
and a concept class over a domain X , and let c ∈ C. For a sample S = ((xi, c(xi)))ni=1 where n ≥
64
α (VC(C) ln(
64
α ) + ln(
8
β )) and the xi are drawn i.i.d. from D, it holds that
Pr
[
∃h ∈ C s.t. errorD(h, c) > α ∧ errorS(h) ≤ α
2
]
≤ β.
This generalization argument extends to the setting of agnostic learning, where a hypothesis with small
empirical error might not exist.
Theorem 2.8 (VC-Dimension Agnostic Generalization Bound, e.g. [1, 2]). Let H be a concept class over
a domain X , and let P be a distribution over X × {0, 1}. For a sample S = ((xi, yi))ni=1 containing
n ≥ 64
α2
(VC(H) ln( 6α) + ln(
8
β )) i.i.d. elements from P , it holds that
Pr
[
∃h ∈ H s.t. ∣∣errorP(h)− errorS(h)∣∣ > α] ≤ β.
Using theorems 2.11 and 2.8, an upper bound of O(VC(C)) on the sample complexity of learning a
concept class C follows by reduction to the empirical learning problem. The goal of empirical learning is
similar to that of PAC learning, except accuracy is measured only with respect to a fixed input database.
Theorems 2.11 and 2.8 state that when an empirical learner is run on sufficiently many samples, it is also
accurate with respect to a distribution on inputs.
Definition 2.9 (Empirical Learner). Algorithm A is an (α, β)-accurate empirical k-learner for a concept
class C using hypothesis class H with sample complexity n if for every collection of concepts (c1, . . . , ck)
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fromC and database S = ((xi, c1(xi), . . . , ck(xi)))ni=1 ∈ (X×{0, 1}k)n, algorithmA outputs k hypotheses
(h1, . . . , hk) from H satisfying
Pr
[
max
1≤j≤k
(
errorS|j (hj)
)
> α
]
≤ β,
where S|j = ((xi, cj(xi)))ni=1. The probability is taken over the coin tosses of A.
Definition 2.10 (Agnostic Empirical Learner). Algorithm A is an agnostic (α, β)-accurate empirical k-
learner for a concept class C using hypothesis class H with sample complexity n if for every database
S = ((xi, y1,i, . . . , yk,i))
n
i=1 ∈ (X × {0, 1}k)n, algorithm A outputs k hypotheses (h1, . . . , hk) from H
satisfying
Pr
[
max
1≤j≤k
(
errorS|j (hj)−minc∈C
(
errorS|j (c)
))
> α
]
≤ β,
where S|j = ((xi, yj,i))ni=1. The probability is taken over the coin tosses of A.
Theorem 2.11. Let A be an (α, β)-accurate empirical k-learner for a concept class C (resp. agnostic em-
pirical k-learner) using hypothesis classH . ThenA is also a (2α, β+β′)-accurate PAC learner forC when
given at least max{n, 32α (VC(H⊕C) log(32/α)+log(8/β′))} samples (resp. max{n, 64α2 (VC(H) log(6/α)+
log(8k/β′)) samples). Here, H ⊕ C = {h⊕ c : h ∈ H, c ∈ C}.
Proof. We begin with the non-agnostic case. Let A be an (α, β)-accurate empirical k-learner for C. Let
D be a distribution over the example space X . Let S be a random i.i.d. sample of size m from D. The
generalization bound for PAC learning (Theorem 2.7) states that if m ≥ 32α (d log(32/α) + log(8/β′))},
then
Pr[∃c ∈ C, h ∈ H : errorS(c, h) ≤ α ∧ errorD(c, h) > 2α] ≤ β′,
where d = VC(H ⊕ C). The result follows by a union bound over the failure probability of A and the
failure of generalization.
Now we turn to the agnostic case. Let A be an agnostic (α, β)-accurate empirical k-learner for C. Fix
an index j ∈ [k], and let Pj be a distribution over X × {0, 1}. Let S be a random i.i.d. sample of size m
from Pj . Then generalization for agnostic learning (Theorem 2.8) yields
Pr[∃h ∈ H : |errorS(h)− errorPj (h)| > α] ≤
β′
k
for m ≥ 64
α2
(VC(H) log(6/α) + log(8k/β′))}.The result follows by a union bound over the failure proba-
bility of A and the failure of generalization for each of the indices j = 1, . . . , k.
Applying the above theorem in the special case where A finds the concept c ∈ C that minimizes the
empirical error on its given sample, we obtain the following sample complexity upper bound for proper
multi-learning.
Corollary 2.12. Let C be a concept class with VC dimension d. There exists an (α, β)-accurate proper
PAC k-learner forC usingO( 1α(d log(1/α)+log(1/β)) samples. Moreover, there exists an (α, β)-accurate
proper agnostic PAC k-learner for C using O( 1
α2
(d log(1/α) + log(k/β)) samples.
Proof. For the non-agnostic case, we simply let A be the (0, 0)-accurate empirical learner that outputs
any vector of hypotheses that is consistent with its given examples (one is guaranteed to exist, since the
target concept satisfies this condition). The claim follows from Theorem 2.11 noting that VC(C ⊕ C) =
O(VC(C)).
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For the agnostic case, consider the algorithm A that on input S outputs hypotheses (h1, . . . , hk) that
minimize the quantities errorSj (hj). Applying the agnostic generalization bound [1], this is an (α/2, β/2)-
accurate agnostic empirical learner given O( 1
α2
(d log(1/α) + log(k/β)) samples. The claim then follows
from Theorem 2.11.
It is known that even for k = 1, the sample complexities of PAC and agnostic learning are at least
Ω(VC(C)/α) and Ω(VC(C)/α2), respectively. Therefore, the above sample complexity upper bound is
tight up to logarithmic factors.
We define a few specific concept classes which will play an important role in this work.
POINTX : Let X be any domain. The class of point functions is the set of all concepts that evaluate to 1
on exactly one element of X , i.e. POINTX = {cx : x ∈ X} where cx(y) = 1 iff y = x. The
VC-dimension of POINTX is 1 for any X .
THRESHX : LetX be any totally ordered domain. The class of threshold functions takes the form THRESHX =
{cx : x ∈ X} where cx(y) = 1 iff y ≤ x. The VC-dimension of THRESHX is 1 for any X .
PARd: Let X = {0, 1}d. The class of parity functions on X is given by PARd = {cx : x ∈ X} where
cx(y) = 〈x, y〉 (mod 2). The VC-dimension of PARd is d.
In this work, we focus our study of the concept class PARd on the problem of learning parities under
the uniform distribution. The PAC and agnostic learning problems are defined as before, except we only
require a learner to be accurate when the marginal distribution on examples is the uniform distribution Ud
over {0, 1}d.
Definition 2.13 (PAC Learning PARd under Uniform). Algorithm A is an (α, β)-PAC k-learner for PARd
using hypothesis class H and sample complexity n if for every fixed (c1, . . . , ck) from C, given a k-labeled
database as an input S = ((xi, c1(xi), . . . , ck(xi)))
n
i=1 where each xi is drawn i.i.d. from Ud, algorithm A
outputs k hypotheses (h1, . . . , hk) from H satisfying
Pr
[
max
1≤j≤k
(errorUd(cj , hj)) > α
]
≤ β.
Definition 2.14 (Agnostically Learning PARd under Uniform). Algorithm A is an (α, β)-PAC agnostic
k-learner for PARd using hypothesis class H and sample complexity n if for every distribution P over
{0, 1}d × {0, 1}k, with marginal distribution Ud over the data universe {0, 1}d, given a k-labeled database
S = ((xi, y1,i, . . . , yk,i))
n
i=1 where each k-labeled sample (xi, y1,i . . . , yk,i) is drawn i.i.d. from P , algo-
rithm A outputs k hypotheses (h1, . . . , hk) from H satisfying
Pr
[
max
1≤j≤k
(
errorPj (hj)−min
c∈C
(
errorPj (c)
))
> α
]
≤ β,
where Pj is the marginal distribution of P on the examples and the jth label.
2.3 Differential privacy
Two k-labeled databases S, S′ ∈ (X × {0, 1}k)n are called neighboring if they differ on a single (multi-
labeled) entry, i.e., |{i : (xi, y1,i, . . . , yk,i) 6= (x′i, y′1,i, . . . , y′k,i)}| = 1.
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Definition 2.15 (Differential Privacy [18]). LetA : (X × {0, 1}k)n → (2X)k be an algorithm that operates
on a k-labeled database and returns k hypotheses. Let , δ ≥ 0. Algorithm A is (, δ)-differentially private
if for all neighboring S, S′ and for all T ⊆ (2X)k,
Pr[A(S) ∈ T ] ≤ e · Pr[A(S′) ∈ T ] + δ,
where the probability is taken over the coin tosses of the algorithm A. When δ = 0 we say that A satisfies
pure differential privacy, otherwise (i.e., if δ > 0) we say that A satisfies approximate differential privacy.
Our learning algorithms are designed via repeated applications of differentially private algorithms on a
database. Composition theorems for differential privacy show that the price of privacy for multiple (adap-
tively chosen) interactions degrades gracefully.
Theorem 2.16 (Composition of Differential Privacy [16, 17, 19]). Let 0 < , δ′ < 1 and δ ∈ [0, 1].
Suppose an algorithm A accesses its input database S only through m adaptively chosen executions of
(, δ)-differentially private algorithms. Then A is
1. (m,mδ)-differentially private, and
2. (′,mδ + δ′)-differentially private for  =
√
2m ln(1/δ′) · + 2m2.
2.4 Differentially Private Sanitization
A fundamental task in differential privacy is the data sanitization problem. Given a databaseD = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
Xn, the goal of a sanitizer is to privately produce a synthetic database Dˆ ∈ Xm that captures the statistical
properties of D. We are primarily interested in sanitization for boolean-valued functions (equivalently re-
ferred to as counting queries). Given a function c : X → {0, 1} and a database D = (x1, . . . , xn), we write
c(D) = 1n
∑n
i=1 c(xi).
Definition 2.17 (Sanitization). An algorithm A : Xn → Xm is an (α, β)-accurate sanitizer for a concept
class C if for every D ∈ Xn, the algorithm A produces a database Dˆ ∈ Xm such that
Pr[∃c ∈ C : |c(D)− c(Dˆ)| > α] ≤ β.
Here, the probability is taken over the coins of A.
In an influential result, Blum, Ligett, and Roth [10] showed that any concept class C admits a differen-
tially private sanitizer with sample complexity O(VC(C) log |X|):
Theorem 2.18 ([10]). For any concept class C over a domain X , there exists an (α, β)-accurate and (, 0)-
differentially private sanitizer A : Xn → Xm for C when
n = O
(
VC(C) · log |X| · log(1/α)
α3
+
log(1/β)
α
)
,
and m = O(VC(C) log(1/α)/α2).
When relaxing to (, δ)-differential privacy, the private multiplicative weights algorithm of Hardt and
Rothblum [24] can sometimes achieve lower sample complexity (roughly O(log |C|√log |X|)).
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Theorem 2.19 ([24]). For any concept class C over a domain X , there exists an (α, β)-accurate and (, δ)-
differentially private sanitizer A : Xn → Xm for C when
n = O
(
(log |C|+ log(1/β)) ·√log |X| · log(1/δ)
α2
)
,
and m = O(VC(C) log(1/α)/α2).
However, for specific concept classes, sanitizers are known to exist with much lower sample complexity.
We first give a sanitizer for point functions with essentially optimal sample complexity, which improves and
simplifies a result of [7].
Proposition 2.20. There exists an (α, β)-accurate and (, δ)-differentially private sanitizer for POINTX with
sample complexity
n = O
(
log(1/αβδ)
α
)
.
Proof. To give a (2α, β)-accurate sanitizer, it suffices to produces, for each point function cx, an approx-
imate answer ax ∈ [0, 1] with |ax − cx| ≤ α. This is because given these approximate answers, one can
reconstruct a database Dˆ of size O(1/α) with |cx(Dˆ)− ax| ≤ α for every x ∈ X .
The algorithm for producing the answers ax is as follows.
Algorithm 1 Query release for POINTX
Input: Privacy parameters (, δ), database D ∈ Xn
For each x ∈ X , do the following:
1. If cx(D) ≤ α4 , release ax = 0
2. Let aˆx = cx(D) + Lap(2/n)
3. If aˆx ≤ α2 , release ax = 0
4. Otherwise, release ax = aˆx
First, we argue that Algorithm 1 is (, δ)-differentially private. Below, we write X ≈(,δ) Y to denote
the fact that for every measurable set S in the union of the supports of X and Y , we have Pr[X ∈ S] ≤
e Pr[Y ∈ S] + δ.
Let D ∼ D′ be adjacent databases of size n, with x ∈ D replaced by x′ ∈ D′. Then the output
distribution of the mechanism differs only on its answers to the queries cx and cx′ . Let us focus on cx. If
both cx(D) ≤ α/4 and cx(D′) ≤ α/4, then the mechanism always releases 0 for both queries. If both
cx(D) > α/4 and cx(D′) > α/4, then ax(D) ≈(/2,0) ax(D′) by properties of the Laplace mechanism.
Finally, if cx(D) > α/4 but cx(D′) ≤ α/4, then cx(D′) = 0 with probability 1. Moreover, we must have
POINTx(D) ≤ α/4 + 1/n, so
Pr[ax(D) = 0] ≥ Pr[Lap(2/n) < α/4− 1/n] = 1− 1
2
exp(−nα/8 + /2) ≥ 1− δ/2.
So in this case, ax(D) ≈(0,δ/2) ax(D′). Therefore, we conclude that overall ax(D) ≈(/2,δ/2) ax(D′). An
identical argument holds for ax′ , so the mechanism is (, δ)-differentially private.
10
Now we argue that the answers ax are accurate. First, the answers are trivially α-accurate for all queries
cx on which cx(D) ≤ α/4. For each of the remaining queries, it is α-accurate with probability at least
Pr[|Lap(2/n)| < α/2] = 1− exp(−nα/4) ≥ 1− αβ
4
.
Taking a union bound over the at most 4/α queries with POINTx(D) > α/4, we conclude that the mecha-
nism is α-accurate for all queries with probability at least 1− β.
Bun et al. [13], improving on work of Beimel et al. [7], gave a sanitizer for threshold functions with
sample complexity roughly 2log
∗ |X|.
Proposition 2.21 ([13]). There exists an (α, β)-accurate and (, δ)-differentially private sanitizer for THRESHX
with sample complexity
n = O
(
1
α
· 2log∗ |X| · log∗ |X| · log
(
log∗ |X|
δ
)
· log(1/β) · log2.5(1/α)
)
.
2.5 Private learners and multi-learners
Generalizing on the concept of private learners [26], we say that an algorithm A is (α, β, , δ)-private PAC
k-learner for C using H if A is (α, β)-PAC k-learner for C using H , and A is (, δ)-differentially private
(similarly with agnostic private PAC k-learners). We omit the parameter k when k = 1 and the parameter δ
when δ = 0.
For the case k = 1, we have a generic construction with sample complexity proportional to log |C|:
Theorem 2.22 ([26]). Let C be a concept class, and α, β,  > 0. There exists an (α, β, )-private agnostic
proper learner for C with sample complexity O
(
(log |C|+ log 1/β)(1/(α) + 1/α2)).
Beimel, Nissim, and Stemmer [8] gave a generic transformation from data sanitization to private learn-
ing, which generally gives improved sample complexity upper bounds.
Theorem 2.23 ([8]). Suppose there exists an (α, β)-accurate and (, δ)-differentially private sanitizer for
C⊕ with sample complexitym. Then there exists a proper (2α, 2β)-PAC and (+′, δ)-differentially private
learner for C with sample complexity
O
(
m+
VC(C)
α3′
log
(
1
α
)
+
1
α′
log
(
1
β
))
.
A number of works [5, 6, 7, 22, 13] have established sharper upper and lower bounds for learning the
specific concept classes POINTX and THRESHX . In the case of pure differential privacy, POINTX requires
Θ(log |X|) samples to learn properly [5], but can be learned improperly with O(1) samples. On the other
hand, the class of threshold functions THRESHX require Ω(log |X|) samples to learn, even improperly [22].
In the case of approximate differential privacy, POINTx and THRESHx can be learned properly with sample
complexities O(1) [7] and O˜(2log
∗ |X|) [13], respectively. Moreover, properly learning threshold functions
requires sample complexity Ω(log∗ |X|).
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2.6 Private PAC learning vs. Empirical Learning
We saw by Theorem 2.11 that when an empirical k-learner A for a concept class C is run on a random
sample of size Ω(VC(C)), it is also a (agnostic) PAC k-learner. In particular, if an empirical k-learner A is
differentially private, then it also serves as a differentially private (agnostic) PAC k-learner.
Generalizing a result of [13], the next theorem shows that the converse is true as well: a differentially
private (agnostic) PAC k-learner yields a private empirical k-learner with only a constant factor increase in
the sample complexity.
Theorem 2.24. Let  ≤ 1. Suppose A is an (, δ)-differentially private (α, β)-accurate (agnostic) PAC
k-learner for a concept class C with sample complexity n. Then there is an (, δ)-differentially private
(α, β)-accurate (agnostic) empirical k-learner A˜ for C with sample complexity m = 9n. Moreover, if A is
proper, then so is the resulting empirical learner A˜.
Proof. We give the proof for the agnostic case; the non-agnostic case is argued identically, and is immediate
from [13]. To construct the empirical learner A˜, we use the fact that the given learner A performs well on
any distribution over labeled examples – in particular, it performs well on the uniform distribution over rows
of the input database to A˜. Consider a database S = ((xi, y1,i, . . . , yk,i))mi=1 ∈ (X × {0, 1}k)m. On input
S, define A˜ by sampling n rows from S (with replacement), and outputting the result of running A on the
sample. Let S denote the uniform distribution over the rows of S, and let Sj be its marginal distribution
which is uniform over S|j = ((xi, yj,i))mi=1. Then sampling n rows from S is equivalent to sampling n rows
i.i.d. from S. Hence, if (h1, . . . , hk) is the output of A on the subsample, we have
Pr
[
max
1≤j≤k
(
errorS|j (hj)−minc∈C
(
errorSj (c)
))
> α
]
= Pr
[
max
1≤j≤k
(
errorSj (hj)−min
c∈C
(
errorSj (c)
))
> α
]
≤ β.
To show that A˜ remains (, δ)-differentially private, we apply the following “secrecy-of-the-sample”
lemma [26, 13], which shows that the sampling procedure does not hurt privacy.
Lemma 2.25. Fix  ≤ 1 and let A be an (, δ)-differentially private algorithm with sample complexity n.
For m ≥ 2n, the algorithm A˜ described above is (˜, δ˜) for
˜ =
6m
n
and δ˜ = 4 exp
(
6m
n
)
· m
n
· δ.
3 Upper Bounds on the Sample Complexity of Private Multi-Learners
3.1 Generic Construction
In this section we present the following general upper bounds on the sample complexity of private k-learners.
Theorem 3.1. Let C be a finite concept class, and let k ≥ 1. There exists a proper agnostic (α, β, )-private
PAC k-learner for C with sample complexity
Oα,β,
(
k · log k + min{k · log |C| , (k + log |X|) ·VC(C)}),
and there exists a proper agnostic (α, β, , δ)-private PAC k-learner for C with sample complexity
Oα,β,,δ
(√
k · log k + min
{√
k · log |C| , (
√
k + log |X|) ·VC(C) ,
√
k ·VC(C) +
√
log |X| · log |C|
})
.
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The straightforward approach for constructing a private k-learner for a class C is to separately apply a
(standard) private learner for C for each of the k target concepts. Using composition theorem 2.16 to argue
the overall privacy guarantee of the resulting learner, we get the following observation.
Observation 3.2. Let C be a concept class and let k ≥ 1. If there is an (α, β, , δ)-PAC learner for C with
sample complexity n, then
• There is an (α, kβ, k, kδ)-PAC k-learner for C with sample complexity n.
• There is an (α, kβ,O(
√
k log(1δ )+ k
2), O(kδ))-PAC k-learner for C with sample complexity n.
Moreover, if the initial learner is proper and/or agnostic, then so is the resulting learner.
In cases where sample efficient private PAC learners exist, it might be useful to apply Observation 3.2
in order to obtain a private k-learner. For example, Beimel et al. [5, 6] gave an improper agnostic (α, β, )-
PAC learner for POINTX with sample complexity Oα(1 log
1
β ). Using Observation 3.2 yields the following
corollary.
Corollary 3.3. There exists an improper agnostic (α, β, )-PAC k-learner for POINTX with sample com-
plexity Oα,β,(k log k).
For a general concept class C, we can use Observation 3.2 with the generic construction of Theo-
rem 2.22, stating that for every concept class C there exists a private agnostic proper learner A that uses
O(log |C|) labeled examples.
Corollary 3.4. Let C be a concept class, and α, β,  > 0. There exists an (α, β, )-private agnostic proper
k-learner for C with sample complexity Oα,β,(k · log |C|+ k · log k). Moreover, there exists an (α, β, , δ)-
private agnostic proper k-learner for C with sample complexity Oα,β,,δ(
√
k · log |C|+√k · log k).
Example 3.5. There exists a proper agnostic (α, β, )-PAC k-learner for PARd with sample complexity
Oα,β,(kd+ k log k).
As we will see in Section 5, the bounds of Corollary 3.3 and Example 3.5 on the sample complexity of
k-learning POINTX and PARd are tight (up to logarithmic factors). That is, with pure-differential privacy, the
direct sum gives (roughly) optimal bounds for improperly learning POINTX , and for (properly or improperly)
learning PARd. This is not the case for learning THRESHX or for properly learning learning POINTX .
In order to avoid the factor k log |C| (or √k log |C|) in Corollary 3.4, we now show how an idea
used in [8] (in the context of semi-supervised learning) can be used to construct sample efficient private
k-learners. In particular, this construction will achieve tight bounds for learning THRESHX and for properly
learning learning POINTX under pure-differential privacy.
Fix a concept class C, target concepts c1, . . . , ck ∈ C, and a k-labeled database S (we use D to denote
the unlabeled portion of S). For every 1 ≤ j ≤ k, the goal is to identify a hypothesis hj ∈ C with low
errorD(cj , hj) (such a hypothesis also has good generalization). Beimel et al. [8] observed that given a
sanitization Dˆ of D w.r.t. C⊕ = {f⊕g : f, g ∈ C}, for every f, g ∈ C it holds that
errorD(f, g) =
1
|D| |{x ∈ D : (f ⊕ g)(x) = 1}| ≈
1
|Dˆ| |{x ∈ Dˆ : (f ⊕ g)(x) = 1}| = errorDˆ(f, g).
Hence, a hypothesis h with low errorDˆ(h, cj) also has low errorD(h, cj) and vice versa. Let H be the
set of all dichotomies over Dˆ realized by C. Note that ∃f∗j ∈ H that agrees with cj on Dˆ, i.e., ∃f∗j ∈ H s.t.
errorDˆ(f
∗
j , cj) = 0, and hence errorD(f
∗
j , cj) is also low. The thing that works in our favor here is that H
is small – at most 2|Dˆ| ≤ 2VC(C) – and hence choosing a hypothesis out of H is easy. Therefore, for every
j we can use the exponential mechanism to identify a hypothesis hj ∈ H with low errorD(hj , cj).
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Lemma 3.6. Let C be a concept class, and α, β, , δ > 0. There exists an (α, β, )-private agnostic
k-learner for C with sample complexity Oα,β,(VC(C) · log |X| + k · VC(C) + k · log k). Moreover,
there exists an (α, β, , δ)-private agnostic k-learner for C with sample complexity Oα,β,,δ(min{VC(C) ·
log |X|, log |C| ·√log |X|}+√k ·VC(C) +√k · log k).
Lemma 3.6 follows from the following lemma.
Lemma 3.7. Let ′ > 0 and let A be an (α5 , β5 )-accurate (, δ)-private sanitizer for C⊕ with sample com-
plexity m. Then there is an (α, β)-PAC agnostic k-learner for C with sample complexity
O
(
m+
VC(C)
α3′
log(
1
α
) +
1
α′
log(
k
β
) +
1
α2
VC(C) log(
k
αβ
)
)
.
Moreover, it is both (+ k′, δ) and (+
√
2k ln(1/δ)′ + 2k′2, 2δ)-differentially private.
Using Lemma 3.7 with the generic sanitizer of Theorem 2.18 or Theorem 2.19 results in Lemma 3.6.
An important building block of our generic learner is the exponential mechanism of McSherry and
Talwar [27]. A quality function q : X∗ ×F → N defines an optimization problem over the domain X and a
finite solution set F : Given a database S ∈ X∗, choose f ∈ F that (approximately) maximizes q(S, f). The
exponential mechanism solves such an optimization problem sampling a random f ∈ F with probability
∝ exp ( · q(S, f)/2∆q). Here, the sensitivity of a quality function, ∆q, is the maximum over all f ∈ F of
the sensitivity of the function q(·, f).
Proposition 3.8 (Properties of the Exponential Mechanism [27]).
1. The exponential mechanism is (, 0)-differentially private.
2. Let q be a quality function with sensitivity at most 1. Fix a database S ∈ Xn and let OPT =
maxf∈F{q(S, f)}. Let t > 0. Then exponential mechanism outputs a solution f with q(S, f) ≤
OPT−tn with probability at most |F| · exp(−tn/2).
Algorithm 2 GenericLearner
Input: Concept class C, privacy parameters ′, , δ, and a k-labeled database S = (xi, yi,1, . . . , yi,k)ni=1.
We use D = (xi)ni=1 to denote the unlabeled portion of S.
Used Algorithm: An (α5 ,
β
5 )-accurate (, δ)-private sanitizer for C
⊕ with sample complexity m.
1. Initialize H = ∅.
2. Construct an (, δ)-private sanitization D˜ of D w.r.t. C⊕, where |D˜| = O
(
VC(C⊕)
α2
log( 1α)
)
=
O
(
VC(C)
α2
log( 1α)
)
.
3. Let B = {b1, . . . , b|B|} be the set of all points appearing at least once in D˜.
4. For every (z1, . . . , z|B|) ∈ ΠC(B) = {
(
c(b1), . . . , c(b|B|)
)
: c ∈ C}, add to H an arbitrary concept
c ∈ C s.t. c(b`) = z` for every 1 ≤ ` ≤ |B|.
5. For every 1 ≤ j ≤ k, use the exponential mechanism with privacy parameter ′ to choose and return
a hypothesis hj ∈ H with (approximately) minimal error on the examples in S w.r.t. their jth label.
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Proof of Lemma 3.7. The proof is via the construction ofGenericLearner (algorithm 2). Note thatGenericLearner
only accesses S via a sanitizer (on Step 2) and using the exponential mechanism (on Step 5). Composition
theorem 2.16 state thatGenericLearner is both (+k′, δ)-differentially private and (+
√
2k ln(1/δ)′+
2k′2, 2δ)-differentially private. We, thus, only need to prove that with high probability the learner returns
α-good hypotheses.
Fix a distribution P over X ×{0, 1}k, and let Pj denote the marginal distribution of P on the examples
and the jth label. Let S consist of examples (xi, yi,1, . . . , yi,k) ∼ P . We use D = (xi)ni=1 to denote the
unlabeled portion of S, and use S|j = ((xi, yj,i))ni=1 to denote a database containing the examples in S
together with their jth label. Define the following three events:
E1 : For every f, h ∈ C it holds that |errorD(f, h)− errorD˜(f, h)| ≤ 2α5 .
E2 : For every f ∈ C and for every 1 ≤ j ≤ k it holds that |errorS|j (f)− errorPj (f)| ≤ α5 .
E3 : For every 1 ≤ j ≤ k, the hypothesis hj chosen by the exponential mechanism is such that errorS|j (hj) ≤
α
5 + minf∈H
{
errorS|j (f)
}
.
We first argue that when these three events happen algorithmGenericLearner returns good hypotheses.
Fix 1 ≤ j ≤ k, and let c∗j = argminf∈C{errorPj (f)}. We denote ∆ = errorPj (c∗j ). We need to show that
if E1 ∩E2 ∩E3 occurs, then the hypothesis hj returned by GenericLearner is s.t. errorPj (hj) ≤ α+ ∆.
For every (y1, . . . , y|B|) ∈ ΠC(B), algorithm GenericLearner adds to H a hypothesis f s.t. ∀1 ≤
` ≤ |B|, f(b`) = y`. In particular, H contains a hypothesis h∗j s.t. h∗j (x) = c∗j (x) for every x ∈
B, that is, a hypothesis h∗j s.t. errorD˜(h
∗
j , c
∗
j ) = 0. As event E1 has occurred we have that this h
∗
j
satisfies errorD(h∗j , c
∗
j ) ≤ 2α5 . Using the triangle inequality (and event E2) we get that this h∗j satis-
fies errorS|j (h
∗
j ) ≤ errorD(h∗j , c∗j ) + errorS|j (c∗j ) ≤ 3α5 + ∆. Thus, event E3 ensures that algorithm
GenericLearner chooses (using the exponential mechanism) a hypothesis hj ∈ H s.t. errorS|j (hj) ≤
4α
5 + ∆. Event E2 ensures, therefore, that this hj satisfies errorPj (hj) ≤ α + ∆. We will now show
E1 ∩ E2 ∩ E3 happens with high probability.
Standard arguments in learning theory state that (w.h.p.) the empirical error on a (large enough) random
sample is close to the generalization error. Specifically, by setting n ≥ O( 1
α2
VC(C) log( kαβ )), Theorem 2.8
ensures that Event E2 occurs with probability at least (1− 25β).
Assuming that n ≥ m (the sample complexity of the sanitizer used in Step 5), with probability at least
(1− β5 ) for every (h⊕ f) ∈ C⊕ (i.e., for every h, f ∈ C) it holds that
α
5
≥ |Q(h⊕f)(D)−Q(h⊕f)(D˜)|
=
∣∣∣∣∣ |{x ∈ D : (h⊕f)(x)=1}||D| − |{x ∈ D˜ : (h⊕f)(x)=1}||D˜|
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ |{x ∈ D : h(x) 6=f(x)}||D| − |{x ∈ D˜ : h(x)6=f(x)}||D˜|
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣errorD(h, f)− errorD˜(h, f)∣∣ .
Event E1 occurs therefore with probability at least (1− β5 ).
The exponential mechanism ensures that the probability of eventE3 is at least 1−k|H|·exp(−′αm/10)
(see Proposition 3.8). Note that log |H| ≤ |B| ≤ |D˜| = O
(
VC(C)
α2
log( 1α)
)
. Therefore, for n ≥
O
(
VC(C)
α3′ log(
1
α) +
1
α′ log(
k
β )
)
, Event E3 occurs with probability at least (1− β5 ).
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All in all, setting n ≥ O
(
m+ VC(C)
α3′ log(
1
α) +
1
α′ log(
k
β ) +
1
α2
VC(C) log( kαβ )
)
, ensures that the
probability of GenericLearner failing is at most β.
Theorem 3.1 now follows by combining Lemma 3.6 and Corollary 3.4.
For certain concept classes, there are sanitizers with substantially lower sample complexity than the
generic sanitizers. Combining Lemma 3.6 with Proposition 2.20, we obtain:
Corollary 3.9. There is an (α, β)-PAC agnostic k-learner for POINTX with sample complexity
O
(
log(1/αβδ)
α
+
log(1/α)
α3′
+
log(k/β)
α′
+
log(k/αβ)
α2
)
.
Moreover, it is both (+ k′, δ) and (+
√
2k ln(1/δ)′ + 2k′2, 2δ)-differentially private.
Similarly, combining Lemma 3.6 with Proposition 2.21, we obtain:
Corollary 3.10. There is an (α, β)-PAC agnostic k-learner for THRESHX with sample complexity
O
2log∗ |X| · log∗ |X| · log
(
log∗ |X|
δ
)
· log(1/β) · log2.5(1/α)
α
+
log(1/α)
α3′
+
log(k/β)
α′
+
log(k/αβ)
α2
 .
Moreover, it is both (+ k′, δ) and (+
√
2k ln(1/δ)′ + 2k′2, 2δ)-differentially private.
3.2 Upper Bounds for Approximate Private Multi-Learners
In this section we give two examples of cases where the sample complexity of private k-learning is of the
same order as that of non-private k-learning (the sample complexity does not depend on k). Our algorithms
are (, δ)-differentially private, and rely on stability arguments: the identity of the best k concepts, as an
entire vector, is unlikely to change on nearby k-labeled databases. Hence, it can be released privately.
The main technical tool we use is the Adist algorithm of Smith and Thakurta [31]. Our discussion
follows the treatment of [7].
Recall that a quality function q : X∗ × F → N defines an optimization problem over the domain X
and a finite solution set F : Given a database S ∈ X∗, find f ∈ F that (approximately) maximizes q(S, f).
The sensitivity of a quality function, ∆q, is the maximum over all f ∈ F of the sensitivity of the function
q(·, f). The algorithm Adist privately identifies the exact maximizer as long as it is sufficiently stable.
Algorithm 3 Adist
Input: Privacy parameters , δ, database S ∈ X∗, sensitivity-1 quality function q
1. Let f1, f2 ∈ F be the highest scoring and second-highest scoring solutions to q(S, ·), respectively.
2. Let gap = q(S, f1)− q(S, f2), and ĝap = gap + Lap(1/).
3. If ĝap < 1 log
1
δ , output ⊥. Otherwise, output f1.
Proposition 3.11 (Properties of Adist [31]).
1. Algorithm Adist is (, δ)-differentially private.
2. When run on a database S with gap > 1 log
1
δβ , Algorithm Adist outputs the highest scoring solution
f1 with probability at least 1− β.
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3.2.1 Learning Parities under the Uniform Distribution
Theorem 3.12. For every k, d there exists an (α=0, β, , δ)-PAC (non-agnostic) k-learner for PARd under
the uniform distribution with sample complexity O(d log( 1β ) +
1
 log(
1
βδ )).
Recall that (even without privacy constraints) the sample complexity of PAC learning PARd under the
uniform distribution is Ω(d). Hence the sample complexity of privately k-learning PARd (non-agnostically)
under the uniform distribution is of the same order as that of non-private k-learning.
For the intuition behind Theorem 3.12, let c1, . . . , ck denote the k target concepts, and consider the
quality function q(D, (h1, . . . , hk)) = max1≤j≤k{errorD(hj , cj)}. On a large enough sample D we expect
that q(D, (h1, . . . , hk)) ≈ 12 for every (h1, . . . , hk) 6= (c1, . . . , ck), while q(D, (c1, . . . , ck)) = 0. The k
target concepts can hence be privately identified (exactly) using stability techniques.
In order to make our algorithm computationally efficient, we apply the “subsample and aggregate”
idea of Nissim et al. [28]. We divide the input sample into a small number of subsamples, use Gaussian
elimination to (non-privately) identify a candidate hypothesis vector on each subsample, and then select
from these candidates privately.
Algorithm 4 ParityLearner
Input: Parameters , δ, and a k-labeled database S of size n = O(d log(
1
βδ )).
Output: Hypotheses h1, . . . , hk.
1. Split S into m = O(1 log(
1
βδ )) disjoint samples S1, . . . , Sm of size O(d) each. Initiate Y as the
empty multiset.
2. For every 1 ≤ t ≤ m:
(a) For every 1 ≤ j ≤ k try to use Gaussian elimination to identify a parity function yj that agrees
with the labels of the jth column of St.
(b) If a parity is identified for every j, then set Y = Y ∪ {(y1, ..., yk)}. Otherwise set Y =
Y ∪ {⊥}.
3. Use algorithm Adist with privacy parameters , δ to choose and return a vector of k parity functions
(h1, . . . , hk) ∈ (PARd)k with a large number of appearances in Y .
Proof of Theorem 3.12. The proof is via the construction of ParityLearner (algorithm 4). First note that
changing a single input element in S can change (at most) one element of Y . Hence, applying (the (, δ)-
private) algorithm Adist on Y preserves privacy (applying ParityLearner on neighboring inputs amounts
to executing Adist on neighboring inputs).
Now fix k target concepts c1, . . . , ck ∈ PARd and let S be a random k-labeled database containing n
i.i.d. elements from the uniform distribution Ud over X = {0, 1}d, each labeled by c1, . . . , ck. Observe that
(for every 1 ≤ t ≤ m) we have that St contains i.i.d. elements from Ud labeled by c1, . . . , ck. We use Dt to
denote the unlabeled portion of St. Standard arguments in learning theory (cf. Theorem 2.7) state that for
|St| ≥ O(d),
Pr
[
∃h, f ∈ PARd s.t. errorUd(h, f) ≥
1
4
∧ errorDt(h, f) ≤
1
40
]
≤ 1
8
.
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The above inequality holds, in particular, for every hypothesis h ∈ PARd and every target concept cj , and
hence,
Pr
[
∃h ∈ PARd and j s.t. errorUd(h, cj) ≥
1
4
∧ errorDt(h, cj) ≤
1
40
]
≤ 1
8
.
Recall that under the uniform distribution, the only h ∈ PARd s.t. errorUd(h, cj) 6= 12 is cj itself, and hence
Pr
[
∃h ∈ PARd and j s.t. h 6= cj ∧ errorDt(h, cj) ≤
1
40
]
≤ 1
8
.
So, for every 1 ≤ t ≤ m, with probability 7/8 we have that for every label column j the only hypothesis
with empirical error less than 140 on St is the j
th target concept itself (with empirical error 0). In such a
case, step 2a (Gaussian elimination) identifies exactly the vector of k target concepts (c1, . . . , ck). Since
m ≥ O(log( 1β )), the Chernoff bound ensures that except with probability β/2, the vector (c1, . . . , ck) is
identified in at least 3/4 of the iterations of step 2. Assuming that this is the case, the vector (c1, . . . , ck)
appears in Y at least 3m/4 times, while every other vector can appear at most m/4 times. Provided that
m ≥ O(1 log( 1βδ )), algorithm Adist ensures that the k target concepts are chosen with probability 1− β/2.
All in all, algorithm ParityLearner identifies the k target concepts (exactly) with probability 1 − β,
provided that n ≥ O(d log( 1βδ )).
3.2.2 Learning Points
We next show that the class of POINTX can be (non-agnostically) k-learned using constant sample complex-
ity, matching the non-private sample complexity.
Theorem 3.13. For every domain X and every k ∈ N there exists an (α, β, , δ)-PAC (non-agnostic) k-
learner for POINTX with sample complexity O( 1α log(
1
αβδ )).
The proof is via the construction of Algorithm 5. The algorithm begins by privately identifying (using
sanitization) a set of O(1/α) “heavy” elements in the input database, appearing Ω(α) times. The k labels
of such a heavy element can be privately identified using stability arguments (since their duplicity in the
database is large). The labels of a “non-heavy” element can be set to 0 since a target concept can evaluate
to 1 on at most one such non-heavy element, in which case the error is small.
Notation. We use #S(x) to denote the duplicity of a domain element x in a database S. For a distribution
µ we denote µ(x) = Prxˆ∼µ[xˆ = x].
Proof. The proof is via the construction of PointLearner (algorithm 5). First note the algorithm only
access the input database using sanitization on step 1, and using algorithm Adist on step 4. By composition
theorem 2.16, algorithm PointLearner is (, δ)-differentially private.
Let µ be a distribution over X , and let c1, . . . , ck ∈ POINTX be the fixed target concepts. Consider
the execution of PointLearner on a database S = (xi, yi,1, . . . , yi,k)ni=1 sampled from µ and labeled by
c1, . . . , ck. We useD to denote the unlabeled portion of S, Dˆ for the sanitization ofD constructed on step 1,
and write m = |Dˆ|. Define the following good events.
E1 : For every x ∈ X s.t. µ(x) ≥ α it holds that 1n#S(x) ≥ α/10.
E2 : For every x ∈ X we have that | 1m#Dˆ(x)− 1n#S(x)| ≤ α/30.
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Algorithm 5 PointLearner
Input: Privacy parameters , δ, and a k-labeled database S = (xi, yi,1, . . . , yi,k)ni=1. We use D = (xi)ni=1
to denote the unlabeled portion of S.
Output: Hypotheses h1, . . . , hk.
1. Let Dˆ ∈ Xm be an ( 2 , δ2)-private ( α30 , β4 )-accurate sanitization of D w.r.t. POINTX (e.g., using
Proposition 2.20).
2. Let G = {x ∈ X : 1m#Dˆ(x) ≥ α/15} be the set of all “ α15 -heavy” domain elements w.r.t. the
sanitization Dˆ. Note that |G| ≤ 15/α.
3. Let q be the quality function that on input a k-labeled database S, a domain element x, and
a binary vector ~v ∈ {0, 1}k, returns the number of appearances of (x,~v) in S. That is,
q(S, x, (v1, . . . , vk)) = |{i : xi = x ∧ yi,1 = v1 ∧ · · · ∧ yi,k = vk}|.
4. Use algorithm Adist with privacy parameters 2 , δ2 to choose a set of vectors V = {~vx ∈ {0, 1}k :
x ∈ G} maximizing Q(S, V ) = min~vx∈V {q(S, x,~vx)}. That is, we use algorithm Adist to choose
a set of |G| vectors – a vector ~vx for every x ∈ G – such that the minimal number of appearances
of an entry (x,~vx) in the database S is maximized.
5. For 1 ≤ j ≤ k: If the jth entry of every ~vx ∈ V is 0, then set hj ≡ 0. Otherwise, let x be s.t.
~vx ∈ V has 1 as its jth entry, and define hj : X → {0, 1} as hj(y) = 1 iff y = x.
6. Return h1, . . . , hk.
E3 : Algorithm Adist returns a vector set V s.t. q(S, x,~vx) ≥ 1 for every x ∈ G.
We now argue that when these three events happen algorithm PointLearner returns good hypotheses.
First, observe that the set G contains every element x s.t. µ(x) ≥ α: Let x be s.t. µ(x) ≥ α. As event E1
has occurred, we have that 1n#S(x) ≥ α/10. As event E2 has occurred, we have that 1m#Dˆ(x) ≥ α/15,
and therefore x ∈ G.
Note that if q(S, x,~v) ≥ 1 then the example x is labeled as ~v by the target concepts. Thus, as event
E3 has occurred, for every ~vx ∈ V it holds that ~vx = (c1(x), . . . , ck(x)). Now let hj be the jth returned
hypothesis. We next show that hj is α-good. If h 6≡ 0, then let x be the unique element s.t. hj(x) = 1,
and note that (according to step 5) the jth entry of ~vx is 1, and hence, cj(x) = 1. So hj = cj (since cj is a
concept in POINTX ).
If hj ≡ 0 then the jth entry of every ~vx ∈ V is 0. Note that in such a case hj only errs on the
unique element x s.t. cj(x) = 1, and it suffices to show that µ(x) < α. Assume towards contradiction that
µ(x) ≥ α. As before, event E1 ∩ E2 implies that x ∈ G. As event E3 has occurred, we also have that
~vx ∈ V is s.t. q(S, x,~vx) ≥ 1, and the example x is labeled as ~vx by the target concepts. This contradicts
the assumption that the jth entry of ~vx ∈ V is 0.
Thus, whenever E1 ∩ E2 ∩ E3 happens, algorithm PointLearner returns α-good hypotheses. We
will now show E1 ∩ E2 ∩ E3 happens with high probability. Provided n ≥ O( 1α log( 1αδ )), event E2 is
guaranteed to hold with all but probability β/4 by the utility properties of the sanitizer used on step 1. See
Proposition 2.20.
Theorem 2.7 (VC bound) ensures that event E1 holds with probability 1 − β/4, provided that n ≥
O( 1α log(
1
αβ )). To see this, let z ≡ 0 denote the constant 0 hypothesis, and consider the class C =
POINTX ∪{z}. Note that VC(C) = 1. Hence, Theorem 2.11 states that, with all but probability 1−β/4, for
every c ∈ POINTx s.t. errorµ(c, z) ≥ α it holds that errorD(c, z) ≥ α/10. That is, with all but probability
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1− β/4, for every x ∈ X s.t. µ(x) ≥ α it holds that 1n#D(x) = 1n#S(x) ≥ α/10.
Before analyzing event E3, we show that if E2 occurs, then every x ∈ G is s.t. #S(x) ≥ α/30. Let
x ∈ G, that is, x s.t. 1m#Dˆ(x) ≥ α/15. Assuming eventE2 has occurred, we therefore have that 1n#S(x) ≥
α/30. So every x ∈ G appears in S at least αn/30 times with the labels (c1(x), . . . , ck(x)) , ~c(x). Thus,
q(S, x,~c(x)) ≥ αn/30. In addition, for every ~v 6= ~c(x) it holds that q(S, x,~v) = 0, since every appearance
of the example x is labeled by the target concepts. Hence, provided that n ≥ O( 1α log( 1βδ )), algorithmAdist
ensures that event E3 happens with probability at least 1− β/2.
Overall, E1 ∩ E2 ∩ E3 happens with probability at least 1− β.
4 Approximate Privacy Lower Bounds from Fingerprinting Codes
In this section, we show how fingerprinting codes can be used to obtain poly(k) lower bounds against
privately learning k concepts, even for very simple concept classes. Fingerprinting codes were introduced
by Boneh and Shaw [12] to address the problem of watermarking digital content. The connection between
fingerprinting codes and differential privacy lower bounds was established by Bun, Ullman, and Vadhan
[14] in the context of private query release, and has since been extended to a number of other differentially
private analyses [3, 20, 32, 13].
A (fully-collusion-resistant) fingerprinting code is a scheme for distributing codewords w1, . . . , wn to n
users that can be uniquely traced back to each user. Moreover, if any group of users combines its codewords
into a pirate codeword w′, then the pirate codeword can still be traced back to one of the users who con-
tributed to it. Of course, without any assumption on how the pirates can produce their combined codeword,
no secure tracing is possible. To this end, the pirates are constrained according to a marking assumption,
which asserts that the combined codeword must agree with at least one of the pirates’ codeword in each
position. Namely, at an index j where wij = b for every i ∈ b, the pirates are constrained to output w′ with
w′j = b as well.
To illustrate our technique, we start with an informal discussion of how the original Boneh-Shaw finger-
printing code yields an Ω˜(k1/3) sample complexity lower bound for multi-learning threshold functions. For
parameters n and k, the (n, k)-Boneh-Shaw codebook is a matrix W ∈ {0, 1}n×k, whose rows wi are the
codewords given to users i = 1, . . . , n. The codebook is built from a number of highly structured columns,
where a “column of type i” consists of n bits where the first i bits are set to 1 and the last n− i bits are set
to 0. For i = 1, . . . , n − 1, each column of type i is repeated a total of k/(n − 1) times, and the codebook
W is obtained as a random permutation of these k columns. The security of the Boneh-Shaw code is a
consequence of the secrecy of this random permutation. If a coalition of pirates is missing the codeword
of user i, then it is unable to distinguish columns of type i − 1 from columns of type i. Hence, if a pirate
codeword is too consistent with a user i’s codeword in both the columns of type i − 1 and the columns of
type i, a tracing algorithm can reasonably conclude that user i contributed to it. Boneh and Shaw showed
that such a code is indeed secure for k = O˜(n3).
To see how this fingerprinting code gives a lower bound for multi-learning thresholds, consider thresh-
olds over the data universe X = {1, . . . , |X|} for |X| ≥ n. The key observation is that each column of
the Boneh-Shaw codebook can be obtained as a labeling of the examples 1, . . . , n by a threshold concept.
Namely, a column of type i is the labeling of 1, . . . , n by the concept ci. Now suppose a coalition of users
T ⊆ [n] constructs a database S where each row is an example i ∈ T together with the labels wi1, . . . , wik
coming from the codeword given to user i. Let (h1, . . . , hk) be the hypotheses produced by running a thresh-
old multi-learner on the database. If every user has a bit b at index j of her codeword, then the hypothesis
produced by the learner must also evaluate to b on most of the examples. Thus, the empirical averages of
the hypotheses (h1, . . . , hk) on the examples can be used to obtain a pirate codeword satisfying the marking
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assumption. The security of the fingerprinting code, i.e. the fact that this codeword can be traced back to
a user i ∈ T , implies that the learner cannot be differentially private. Hence, n samples is insufficient for
privately learning k = O˜(n3) threshold concepts, giving a sample complexity lower bound of Ω˜(k1/3).
The lower bounds in this section are stated for empirical learning, but extend to PAC learning by Theo-
rem 2.24. We also remark that they hold against the relaxed privacy notion of label privacy, where differen-
tial privacy only needs to hold with respect to changing the labels of one example.
4.1 Fingerprinting Codes
An (n, k)-fingerprinting code consists of a pair of randomized algorithms (Gen,Trace). The parameter n
is the number of users supported by the fingerprinting code, and k is the length of the code. The codebook
generator Gen produces a codebook W ∈ {0, 1}n×k. Each row wi ∈ {0, 1}k of W is the codeword of user
i. For a subset T ⊆ [n], we let WT denote the set {wi : i ∈ T} of codewords belonging to users in T . The
accusation algorithm Trace takes as input a pirate codeword w′ and accuses some i ∈ [n] (or ⊥ if it fails to
accuse any user).
We define the feasible set of pirate codewords for a coalition T and codebook W by
F (WT ) = {w′ ∈ {0, 1}k : ∀j = 1, . . . , k ∃i ∈ S s.t. wij = w′j}.
The basic marking assumption is that the pirate codeword w′ ∈ F (WT ). We say column j is b-marked if
wij = b for every i ∈ [n].
Definition 4.1 (Fingerprinting Codes). For n, k ∈ N and ξ ∈ (0, 1], a pair of algorithms (Gen,Trace) is an
(n, k)-fingerprinting code with security ξ if Gen outputs a codebookW ∈ {0, 1}n×k and for every (possibly
randomized) adversary AFP , and every coalition T ⊆ [n], if we take w′ ←R AFP (WT ), then the following
properties hold.
Completeness: Pr [w′ ∈ F (WT ) ∧ Trace(w′) = ⊥] ≤ ξ,
Soundness: Pr [Trace(w′) ∈ [n] \ T ] ≤ ξ,
Each probability is taken over the coins of Gen,Trace, andAFP . The algorithms Gen and Trace may share
a common state, which is hidden to ease notation.
4.2 Lower Bound for Improper PAC Learning
Our lower bounds for multi-learning follow from constructions of fingerprinting codes with additional struc-
tural properties.
Definition 4.2. Let C be a concept class over a domain X . An (n, k)-fingerprinting code (Gen,Trace) is
compatible with concept classC if there exist x1, . . . , xn ∈ X such that for every codebookW in the support
of Gen, there exist concepts c1, . . . , ck such that wij = cj(xi) for every i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , k.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose there exists an (n, k)-fingerprinting code compatible with a concept class C with
security ξ. Let α ≤ 1/3, β,  > 0, and δ < 1−ξ−βn − eξ. Then every (improper) (α, β)-accurate and
(, δ)-differentially private empirical k-learner for C requires sample complexity greater than n.
The proof of Theorem 4.3 follows the ideas sketched above.
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Proof. Let (Gen,Trace) be an (n, k)-fingerprinting code compatible with the concept class C, and let
x1, . . . , xn ∈ X be its associated universe elements. Let D = (x1, . . . , xn) and let A be an (α, β)-accurate
empirical k-learner for C with sample complexity n. We will useA to design an adversaryAFP against the
fingerprinting code.
Let T ⊆ [n] be a coalition of users, and consider a codebook W ←R Gen. The adversary strategy
AFP (WT ) begins by constructing a labeled database S = (Si)ni=1 by setting Si = (xi, wi1, . . . , wik) for
each i ∈ T and to a nonce row for i /∈ T . It then runs A(S) obtaining hypotheses (h1, . . . , hk). Finally, it
computes for each j = 1, . . . , k the averages
hj(D) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
hj(xi)
and produces a pirate word w′ by setting each w′j to the value of aj rounded to 0 or 1.
Now consider the coalition T = [n]. Since the fingerprinting code is compatible with C, each column
(w1j , . . . , wnj) = (cj(x1), . . . , cj(xn)) for some concept cj ∈ C. Thus, if the hypotheses (h1, . . . , hk) are
α-accurate for (c1, . . . , ck) on S, then w′ ∈ F (WT ) = F (W ). Therefore, by the completeness property of
the code and the (α, β)-accuracy of A, we have
Pr [Trace(AFP (W )) 6= ⊥] ≥ 1− ξ − β.
In particular, there exists an i∗ for which
Pr [Trace(AFP (W )) = i∗] ≥ 1− ξ − β
n
.
On the other hand, by the soundness property of the code,
Pr [Trace(AFP (W−i∗)) = i∗] ≤ ξ.
Thus, A cannot be (, δ)-differentially private whenever
1− ξ − β
n
> e · ξ + δ.
Remark 4.4. If we additionally assume that there exists an element x0 ∈ X with c1(x0) = c2(x0) = · · · =
ck(x0), then we can use a “padding” argument to obtain a stronger lower bound of n/3α. More specifically,
suppose c1(x0) = · · · = ck(x0) = 0. We pad the database S constructed above with (1/3α − 1)n copies
of the junk row (x0, 0, . . . , 0). Now if a hypothesis h is α-accurate for a 0-marked column, it’s empirical
average will be at most α. On the other hand, an α-accurate hypothesis for a 1-marked column will have
empirical average at least 2α. Since there is a gap between these two quantities, a pirate algorithm can still
turn an accurate vector of k hypotheses into a feasible codeword.
As observed earlier, the (n, k)-Boneh-Shaw code is compatible with the concept class THRESHX for any
|X| ≥ n. Thus, instantiating Theorem 4.3 (and Remark 4.4) with the Boneh-Shaw code yields a lower
bound for k-learning thresholds.
Lemma 4.5 ([12]). Let X be a totally ordered domain with |X| ≥ n for some n ∈ N. Then there exists
an (n, k)-fingerprinting code compatible with the concept class THRESHX with security ξ as long as k ≥
2n3 log(2n/ξ).
Corollary 4.6. Every improper (α, β)-accurate and ( = O(1), δ = o(1/n))-differentially private empiri-
cal k-learner for THRESHX requires sample complexity min{|X|, Ω˜(k1/3/α)}.
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Discussion. Compatibility with a concept class is an interesting measure of the complexity of a fingerprint-
ing code which warrants further attention. Peikert, shelat, and Smith [29] showed that structural constraints
(related to compatibility) on a fingerprinting code give a lower bound on its length beyond the general lower
bound of k = Ω˜(n2) for arbitrary fingerprinting codes. In particular, they showed that the length k = O˜(n3)
of the Boneh-Shaw code is essentially tight for the “multiplicity paradigm”, where a codebook is a random
permutation of a fixed set of columns, each repeated the same number of times. We take this as evidence that
our Ω˜(k1/3) lower bound for THRESHX cannot be improved via compatible fingerprinting codes. However,
closing the gap between our lower bound and the upper bound of roughly
√
k remains an intriguing open
question.
A natural avenue for obtaining stronger poly(k) lower bounds for private k-learning is to identify com-
patible fingerprinting codes with shorter length. Tardos [33] showed the existence of an (n, k)-fingerprinting
code of optimal length k = O˜(n2) (see Proposition 4.9). The construction of his code differs significantly
from multiplicity paradigm: for each column j of the Tardos code, a bias pj ∈ (0, 1) is sampled from a
fixed distribution, and then each bit of the column is sampled i.i.d. with bias pj . Hence, the columns of
the Tardos code are supported on all bit vectors in {0, 1}n. This means that for a concept class C to be
compatible with the (n, k)-Tardos code, it must be the case that VC(C) ≥ n. Thus, the lower bound one
obtains against k-learning C only matches the lower bound for PAC learning C (without privacy). It would
be very interesting to construct a fingerprinting code of optimal length k = O˜(n2) with substantially fewer
than 2n column types (and hence compatible with a concept class of VC-dimension smaller than n).
4.3 Lower Bound for Agnostic Learning
In the agnostic learning model, a learner has to perform well even when the columns of a multi-labeled
database do not correspond to any concept. This allows us to apply the argument of Theorem 4.3 without
the constraint of compatibility. The result is that any fingerprinting code, in particular one with optimal
length, gives an agnostic learning lower bound for any non-trivial concept class.
Theorem 4.7. Suppose there exists an (n, k)-fingerprinting code with security ξ. Let C be a concept class
with at least two distinct concepts. Let α ≤ 1/3, β,  > 0, and δ < 1−ξ−βn − eξ. Then every (improper) ag-
nostic (α, β)-accurate and (, δ)-differentially private empirical k-learner forC requires sample complexity
greater than n.
Proof. The proof follows in much the same way as that of Theorem 4.3. Let (Gen,Trace) be an (n, k)-
fingerprinting code, and let x ∈ X be such that there exist c0, c1 ∈ C with c0(x) = 0 and c1(x) = 1.
Let A be an agnostic (α, β)-accurate empirical k-learner for C with sample complexity n. Define a the
fingerprinting code adversary AFP just as in Theorem 4.3. Namely, AFP constructs examples of the form
(x,wi1, . . . , wij) with the available rows of the fingerprinting code, runs A on the result, and returns the
rounded empirical averages of the k resulting hypotheses.
To show that A cannot be (, δ)-differentially private, it suffices to show that if A produces accurate hy-
potheses h1, . . . , hk, then the pirate codeword produced byAFP is feasible. To see this, suppose h1, . . . , hk
are accurate, i.e.
max
1≤j≤k
(
errorS|j (hj)−minc∈C
(
errorS|j (c)
))
≤ α.
Let column j of the codebook W be 0-marked, i.e. wij = 0 for all i ∈ [n]. Recall that c0(x) = 0, and hence
errorS|j (c0) = 0. Therefore, since hypothesis hj is α-accurate, we have errorS|j (hj) ≤ α. This implies
that bit w′j of the pirate codeword is 0. An identical argument shows that the bits of the pirate codeword in
the 1-marked columns are also 1. Thus, if A produces accurate hypotheses, the pirate codeword produced
by AFP is feasible. The rest of the argument in the proof of Theorem 4.3 completes the proof.
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Remark 4.8. Just as in Remark 4.4, a padding argument shows how to obtain a lower bound of n/3α
under some additional assumptions on C, e.g. if the distinct concepts also share a common point x′ with
c0(x
′) = c1(x′).
Proposition 4.9 ([33]). For n ∈ N and ξ ∈ (0, 1), there exists an (n, k)-fingerprinting code with security ξ
as long as k = O(n2 log(n/ξ)).
Corollary 4.10. Every improper agnostic (α, β)-accurate and ( = O(1), δ = o(1/n))-differentially pri-
vate empirical k-learner for POINTX , THRESHX , PARd requires sample complexity min{|X|, Ω˜(k1/2)}.
The same proof yields a lower bound for agnostically learning parities under the uniform distribution.
Proposition 4.11. Suppose there exists an (n, k)-fingerprinting code with security ξ. Let α ≤ 1/6, β > 0
and d = log n. Then every (improper) agnostic (α, β,  = O(1), δ = o(1/n))-PAC k-learner for PARd
requires sample complexity Ω(n).
Proof sketch. By Lemma 2.24, it is enough to rule out a private empirical learner for a database whose n ex-
amples are the distinct binary strings in {0, 1}d. To do so, we follow the proof of Theorem 4.7, highlighting
the changes that need to be made. First, we let c0 be the all-zeroes concept, and let c1 be an arbitrary other
parity function. Second, AFP instead constructs examples of the form (xi, wi1, . . . , wik) where xi is the
ith binary string. Finally, when converting the hypotheses (h1, . . . , hk) into a feasible codeword, we instead
set w′j to 0 if hj(D) ≤ α, and set w′j to 1 if hj(D) ≥ 12 − α. This works because, while errorS|j (c0) = 0
with respect to 0-marked columns, any concept (and in particular, c1) has error 12 with respect to 1-marked
columns.
5 Examples where Direct Sum is Optimal
In this section we show several examples for cases where the direct sum is (roughly) optimal. As we saw in
Section 4, with (, δ)-differential privacy, every non-trivial agnostic k-learner requires sample complexity
Ω(
√
k). We can prove a similar result for -private learners, that holds even for non-agnostic learners:
Theorem 5.1. Let C be any non-trivial concept class over a domain X (i.e., |C| ≥ 2). Every proper or
improper (α, β=12 , )-private PAC k-learner for C requires sample complexity Ω(k/).
In [5, 6, 7], Beimel et al. presented an agnostic proper learner for POINTX with sample complex-
ity Oα,β,,δ(1) under (, δ)-privacy, and an agnostic improper learner for POINTX with sample complex-
ity Oα,β,,δ(1) under -privacy. Hence, using Observation 3.2 (direct sum) with their results yields an
(α, β, , δ)-PAC agnostic proper k-learner for POINTX with sample complexity O˜α,β,,δ(
√
k), and an (α, β, )-
PAC agnostic improper k-learner for POINTX with sample complexity O˜α,β,(k). As supported by our lower
bounds (Corollary 4.10 and Theorem 5.1), those learners have roughly optimal sample complexity (ignoring
the dependency in α, β, , δ and logarithmic factors in k).
Proof of Theorem 5.1. The proof is based on a packing argument [25, 5]. Let x ∈ X and f, g ∈ C be s.t.
f(x) 6= g(x). Let µ denote the constant distribution over X giving probability 1 to the point x. Note that
errorµ(f, g) = 1. Moreover, observe that for every concept h, if errorµ(h, f) < 1 then h(x) = f(x), and
similarly with h, g.
Let A be an (α, β, )-private PAC k-learner for C with sample complexity n. For every choice of k
target functions (c1, . . . , ck) = ~c ∈ {f, g}k, let S~c denote the k-labeled database containing n copies of
the point x, each of which is labeled by c1, . . . , ck. Without loss of generality, we can assume that on such
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databases A returns hypotheses in {f, g} (since under µ we can replace an arbitrarily chosen hypothesis
h with f if f(x) = h(x) or with g if g(x) = h(x)). Therefore, by the utility properties of A, for every
~c = (c1, . . . , ck) ∈ {f, g}k we have that PrA[A(S~c) = (c1, . . . , ck)] ≥ 12 . By changing the database S~c to
S~c′ one row at a time while applying the differential privacy constraint, we see that
Pr
A
[A(S~c) = (c′1, . . . , c′k)] ≥
1
2
e−n.
Since the above inequality holds for every two databases S~c and S~c′ , we get
1
2
≥ Pr
A
[A(S~c) 6= (c1, . . . , ck)] ≥ (2k − 1)1
2
e−n.
Solving for n, this yields n = Ω(k/).
Remark 5.2. The above proof could easily be strengthened to show that n = Ω( kα), provided that C
contains two concepts f, g s.t. ∃x, y ∈ X for which f(x) 6= g(x) and f(y) = g(y).
The following lemma shows that the sample complexities of properly and improperly learning parities
under the uniform distribution are the same. Thus, for showing lower bounds, it is without loss of generality
to consider proper learners.
Lemma 5.3. Let α < 1/4. Let A be a (possibly improper) (α, β, , δ)-PAC k-learner for PARd under the
uniform distribution with sample complexity n. Then there exists a proper (α′ = 0, β, , δ)-PAC k-learner
A′ for PARd (under the uniform distribution) with sample complexity n.
Proof. The algorithm A′ runs A and “rounds” each hypothesis hj produced to the nearest parity function.
That is, it outputs (h′1, . . . , h′k) where h
′
j is a parity function that minimizes Prx∼Ud [h
′
j(x) 6= hj(x)]. Since
this is just post-processing of the differentially private algorithm A, the proper learner A remains (, δ)-
differentially private.
Now suppose (h1, . . . , hk) is α-accurate for parity functions (c1, . . . , ck) on the uniform distribution.
Then for each j,
Pr
x∼Ud
[h′j(x) 6= cj(x)] ≤ Pr
x∼Ud
[h′j(x) 6= hj(x)] + Pr
x∼Ud
[hj(x) 6= cj(x)]
≤ 2 Pr
x∼Ud
[hj(x) 6= cj(x)]
≤ 2α.
Hence, errorUd(h
′
j , cj) < 1/2. Since the error of any parity function from cj (other than cj itself) is exactly
1/2 under the uniform distribution, we conclude that (h′1, . . . , h′k) is in fact 0-accurate for (c1, . . . , ck).
Theorem 5.4. Let α < 14 . Every (α, β=
1
2 , )-PAC k-learner for PARd (under the uniform distribution)
requires sample complexity Ω(kd/).
As we saw in Example 3.5, applying direct sum for k-learning parities results in a proper agnostic
(α, β, )-PAC k-learner for PARd with sample complexity Oα,β,(kd + k log k). As stated by Theorem 5.4,
this is the best possible (ignoring logarithmic factors and the dependency in α, β, ).
Proof of Theorem 5.4. The proof is based on a packing argument [25, 5]. Let A be an (α, β, )-PAC k-
learner for PARd with sample complexity n. By Lemma 5.3, we may assume A is proper and learns the
hidden concepts exactly.
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For every choice of k parity functions (c1, . . . , ck) = ~c ∈ (PARd)k, let S~c denote a random k-labeled
database containing n i.i.d. elements from Ud, each labeled by (c1, . . . , ck). By the utility properties of A
we have that PrUd,A[A(S~c) = ~c] ≥ 12 . In particular, for every ~c ∈ (PARd)k there exists a databaseD~c labeled
by ~c s.t. PrA[A(S~c) = ~c] ≥ 12 . By changing the database D~c to D~c′ one row at a time while applying the
differential privacy constraint, we see that
Pr
A
[A(D~c) = ~c′] ≥ 1
2
e−n.
Since the above inequality holds for every two databases D~c and D~c′ , we get
1
2
≥ Pr
A
[A(D~c) 6= ~c] ≥ (| PARd |k − 1)1
2
e−n.
Solving for n, this yields n = Ω(kd/).
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